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1. Introduction
Wireless networks, because of their many advantages in comparison with the wired ones, have
become the predominant technology for deployment of communications infrastructure.
WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access), which is an industry branding
for IEEE 802.16 Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) sets of standard [1, 2], provides
wireless access to mobile devices with a range of Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees for
various types of applications. There are diverse versions of IEEE 802.16 standard, but IEEE
802.16e [3] also known as Mobile WiMAX, is the most well-known version, though newer
versions have also been formulated.
As for the security model of IEEE 802.16, it has been designed to guarantee authentication,
confidentiality and integrity. Among the series of IEEE 802.16 standards, the IEEE 802.16d [4]
was defined for fixed wireless access. It uses Privacy Key Management Version 1 (PKMv1) to
define, manage and distribute the security keys, but there are several security issues in PKMv1.
Hence, in IEEE 802.16e, an enhanced key management scheme called Privacy Key Management
Version 2 (PKMv2) was introduced to mitigate the security shortcomings of PKMv1. The
PKMv2 uses Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [5] and RSA algorithm [6] as authen‐
tication methods. The authentication mechanism ensures that when a Mobile Station (MS)
enters a Base Station (BS) coverage area, it should perform authentication and authorization
in order to obtain the security keys that will protect data more securely.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the main concept of
WiMAX architecture which focuses mainly on the security parts. Section 3 reviews key
management protocols in Mobile WiMAX. Finally, section 4 presents our conclusion and
suggestions for future works.
© 2013 Gilanian-Sadeghi et al.; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2. WiMAX architecture
2.1. Protocol stack
The protocol stack of IEEE 802.16 standard consists of two main layers: Medium Access Control
(MAC) layer and Physical (PHY) layer [2]. The MAC layer is subdivided into three sub-layers
[7], namely it (CS), Common Part Sub-layer (CPS) and Security Sub-layer (SS) as shown in
Figure 1.
The service specific convergence sub-layer communicates with higher layers and receives
packets from them and then do some specific functions like packet/frame classification and
header suppression. Next, it encapsulates these packets into MAC Service Data Unit (MAC
SDU) format, and then distributes MAC SDUs to common part sub-layer. Asynchronous
Transfer Mode (ATM) convergence and packet convergence sub-layers are two types of service
specific convergence sub-layer. The ATM convergence sub-layer is used for ATM networks,
and the packet convergence sub-layer is used for packet services like Ethernet, IPv4 and IPv6.
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Figure 1. Protocol stack of IEEE 802.16 [2]
The main part of the IEEE 802.16 standard is common part sub-layer which is responsible for
bandwidth allocation, connection management, scheduling, connection control, automatic
repeat request and QoS enforcement.
The security sub-layer is responsible for providing authentication, authorization and secured
key exchange. It is also used for encryption and decryption of data from the MAC layer to PHY
layer and vice versa. Two main protocols of security sub-layer are [3]:
1. Encapsulation Protocol, which is used for ciphering operations on data in the networks,
2. PKM protocol, which is used for secure key distribution between BS and MSs, and also it
enables the BS to enforce conditional access to network services.
The PHY layer receives MAC frames and then transmits them through coding and modulation
of radio frequency signals. It supports Frequency Division Duplexing (FDD) and Time
Division Multiplexing (TDM).
Selected Topics in WiMAX130
2.2. Security sub-layer
The architecture of security sub-layer is shown in Figure 2. As mentioned previously, the
security sub-layer provides security services for the standard, and it has been made based on
two main components; an encapsulation protocol and a key management protocol [3]. The
encapsulation protocol introduces the encryption and authentication methods as cryptograph‐
ic suites which is a pair of encryption and authentication algorithms.
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Figure 2. Security sub-layer architecture [3]
Initially, WiMAX security was introduced in the security sub-layer of IEEE 802.16 standard [1].
After releasing the initial versions of the IEEE 802.16 standard, a number of articles such as in
[8-10] criticized the security weaknesses of the standard, after which some security improve‐
ments were added in IEEE 802.16e [3] and IEEE 802.16m [11]. The security functions regarding
key managements have been addressed by PKM protocol. In IEEE 802.16d [4], the key
management is based on PKMv1 while IEEE 802.16e uses PKMv2, which is an enhanced
version of PKMv1.
Generally, PKM protocol is responsible for authorization, authentication, key exchange and
data encryption in the networks between the MSs and BS. In the subsequent sections, we focus
our attention on PKMv2, because it is stronger than PKMv1 in terms of security. Recently, the
PKMv3 [11] was launched with IEEE 802.16m standard, however, since this protocol is still
new and only a few works are being done on it, it is not discussed further in this chapter.
The PKMv2 is used by MSs to get authorization and security keys from the BS, and also to
guarantee continuous and uninterrupted re-authorization/re-authentication and refreshing of
the security keys. The PKMv2 applies EAP protocol together with RSA algorithm or a mixed
function starting with RSA followed by EAP. As shown in Figure 3, in EAP of PKMv2, the root
of the security keys is Master Session Key (MSK), and the other keys such as Key Encryption
Key (KEK) are obtained from the MSK.
The procedure of security keys generation using the EAP method is shown in Figure 3. In this
Figure, the result of EAP authentication protocol is MSK. Then both the MS and BS make a
Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by removing some bits of the MSK using a number of functions
such as Dot16KDF [12], and also they generate an Authorization Key (AK) from the PMK. After
making the AK, the BS and MS will establish the Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the AK. The
BS and MS use a 3-way handshake to drive Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) which is used to
encrypt data in the network between the BS and MSs. The Multicast Broadcast Service (MBS)
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is then applied when there are several MSs whereby the MBS is used to send the messages to
them. In this case, both BS and MS need to generate and use some group keys.
IEEE 802.16 supports multicast for applications such as pay-tv and videoconferencing. In order
to establish a secure multicast over IEEE 802.16, main components of the standard must be
used, namely Multicast Broadcast Service (MBS) and Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying
Algorithm (MBRA). We will explain how this is done in the next section.
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Figure 3. Key generation at initial network entry [12]
3. Key management protocols
There are three types of Key management protocols, viz, centralized, hierarchical and distrib‐
uted key management [13]. WiMAX Network uses a centralized key management where there
is a single manager (BS) that executes key management procedure for all its members (MSs).
Though some key management protocols have been proposed for WiMAX, their protocols still
remained inefficient.
Generally, key management establishes a set of group keys for its members [14], and the
main  function  of  it  is  to  update  the  group keys,  this  is  called  rekeying  algorithm [15].
The key management protocols have to face several challenges, but the most outstanding
challenges  among them are  on performance and security,  as  shown in  Figure  4.  Under
performance are issues such as operational efficiency, scalability and 1-affects-n phenom‐
enon  [16,  17].  Operational  efficiency  is  the  most  important  parameter  in  performance
measure and is measured typically by storage, communications and computational costs
respectively. In measuring the performance of key management, the storage costs refer to
the  number  of  keys  stored  by  the  BS  and  MSs;  the  communications  costs  refer  to  the
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number  of  transmitted  group  keys  upon  a  rekeying  algorithm,  and  the  computational
costs  refer  to  the  cost  of  ciphering  operations  in  order  to  get  the  updated  group keys.
Scalability means the capability of key management protocol to handle a large group of
members, and also its ability to manage highly dynamic membership changes. The 1-af‐
fects-n phenomenon is estimated from the number of members affected by rekeying op‐
erations.  Moreover,  a  key  management  should  support  forward  secrecy,  which  means
that  the  MSs  that  leave  a  BS  cannot  read  future  messages;  and  also  it  must  guarantee
backward secrecy, which means that a new MS cannot read previous messages [9].
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Figure 4. Key management’s challenges
3.1. Multicast and broadcast service
Multicast and Broadcast Service (MBS) of IEEE 802.16e is a new feature for broadband wireless
standards [3]. It is a mechanism that allows a BS to distribute the same set of data to several
MSs concurrently. As highlighted before, first the MSs need to be authenticated by the BS using
PKMv2 [3]. After that, the Group Key Encryption Key (GKEK) and the Group Traffic Encryp‐
tion Key (GTEK) are established. IEEE 802.16e introduced the MBRA as a basic rekeying
algorithm to generate, update and distribute the GKEKs and GTEKs upon member changes.
The MBRA uses the GTEK which is shared among all MSs to encapsulate the data traffic. The
BS generates the GKEK and the key is used to encapsulate the GTEK. The GKEK is also
encapsulated by the KEK of each MS. Each MS has a unique KEK which is obtained from the
AK. Although, the MBRA of MBS is quite well designed, it still suffers from efficiency and
scalability problem and it does not address backward and forward secrecy [8, 18]. To explain
this point, in the MBRA algorithm, the BS should unicast n messages, where n is the number
of MS, with the aim of updating the group keys, which unfortunately would cause weak
scalability due to the increased number of unicast messages. Moreover, when there are high
numbers of MSs, and the effect of sending high volume of unicast/broadcast messages would
increase communication costs, and consequently this will result in poor efficiency.
Rekeying algorithms in WiMAX networks need to execute using one of the following three
events:
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1. when a new MS joins the BS,
2. when the life time of both GTEK and GKEK expire,
3. when an MS leaves the BS.
The MBRA algorithm of Mobile WiMAX which is a simple rekeying will only happen at the
expiration time of GTEK or GKEK. As shown in Figure 5, from time to time, the BS broadcasts
message (1) encrypted by GKEK to all MSs in order to update the GTEK as well as sending a
unicast message (2) to all MSs which has been encapsulated by the KEK of each MS as shown
by the equations below:
 : { }Þ GKEKBS all MS GTEK (1)
 : { }® KEKBS each MS GKEK (2)
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Figure 5. MBRA messages [19]
The nomenclatures are listed as in Table 1.
X⇒Y X broadcasts a message to Y
X→Y X unicasts a message to Y
[X] Y X encrypted by using key Y
MSSGi The collection of all MSs within subgroupi
Table 1. Nomenclature of key management
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3.2. Rekeying algorithms
As mentioned earlier, in the MBRA algorithm, the number of unicast messages on rekeying
increase with the number of MS, and hence this method is neither scalable nor efficient. In
addition, it does not address forward and backward secrecy, which consequently would lead
to this method being vulnerable to attacks [8, 9].
Researchers in [18] performed a detailed analysis of the MBRA algorithm and identified its
deficiencies. They proposed an improved scheme to address the deficiencies identified. Even
though their method showed some improvements on the MBRA, but they suffer a downside
in that, the BS needs to send n (n being the number of MS) unicast messages upon every
membership changes, which consequently resulted in the drastic drop in network efficiency
for a large number of MSs. In addition, the proposed method also sends some plaintexts for
message broadcasting, which could cause critical security breaches [19]. In fact, despite some
improvements to the MBRA rekeying, the proposed method suffers from some security issues
such as Denial of Service (DoS) [19] as well as poor scalability and efficiency. In addition, it
does not address the 1-affects-n phenomenon [17], very well.
The authors in [20] proposed a new group key management protocol called Group-Based Key
Distribution Algorithm (GKDA) in which the security keys are distributed into subgroups.
The MBS group is first divided into N subgroups; hence, N GKEKs for the subgroups are used
instead of one GKEK being shared among all MSs. By doing so, only that GKEK which is used
for a certain subgroup needs to be updated whenever any membership change (e.g. leave
event) occurs in that subgroup. The GKEK is encapsulated by each MS’s KEK in the subgroup,
and then unicast to each MS. Although the GKDA provides forward and backward secrecy, it
is still not scalable and efficient enough, because when the number of MS in each subgroup
grows bigger, the number of unicast messages to update GKEKs grows likewise. Nevertheless,
GKDA is still better than MBRA in terms of reducing the number of unicast messages needed
to perform updates of the group keys. In GKDA, the GTEK update mode is more lengthy
because it consists of N GTEKs which are encapsulated by N GKEKs, and thus it consumes
more energy to send the messages. Moreover, the scheme does not have a good support for 1-
affects-n phenomenon.
In [21], the authors proposed an algorithm called Efficient sub-Linear rekeying Algorithm with
Perfect Secrecy (ELAPSE) in order to address the problems of MBRA algorithm. Although this
method solves the forward and backward secrecy problems, it suffers from some weaknesses
in terms of scalability and efficiency. In ELAPSE, when member join or leave events happen
frequently within a large group, the overall performance will degrade due to communication
and computational costs. This method is based on key hierarchy and sub-grouping of the MSs
in the cell by means of a binary tree. ELASPE divides the number of MS into N=log (n,2)
subgroups where n is the number of MS, and each subgroup keeps a set of hierarchical keys
named Sub Group KEKs (SGKEKs) instead of a single GKEK. The number of subgroups (N)
is defined in advance by the administrator depending on the application’s requirements, i.e.
the number of subgroups is permanent. The result is weak performance in terms of efficiency
and scalability. We illustrate this issue by way of an example as shown in Figure 6, which
shows a binary tree with four subgroups. All MSs maintain similar GTEK, and each MS in each
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subgroup saves a set of SGKEKs; for example, the MSs in subgroup1 store three group keys
SGKEK1, SGKEK2 and SGKEK1234. The SGKEK1234 is similar with the GKEK in MBRA. In this
case, GKEK is not delivered to each MS by unicast message, instead it is distributed among
the subgroups via broadcast messages.
 
SGKEK1234 
SGKEK1 SGKEK2 
SGKEK12 SGKEK34 
SGKEK3 SGKEK4 
subgroup1 subgroup2 subgroup3 subgroup4 
Figure 6. Key Hierarchy with four subgroups [21]
When there is no new member joining or leaving, and the lifetime of GTEK expires, the BS
broadcasts a new GTEK encapsulated by SGKEK1234 to all MSs represented as message (3)
below.
1234 : { }Þ SGKEKBS all MSs GTEK (3)
Upon a member join event, i.e. when a new MS enters into the BS coverage area, and sub‐
group2 has the lowest number of members, then the BS assigns it to subgroup2. The BS unicasts
message (4) below to the new MS and all MSs in subgroup2 in order to update the group keys.
Message (4) is then encapsulated by KEK of each MS, and contains all new group keys from
subgroup2 to the root of binary tree.
2 1234 12 2&  : { , , , }® SG KEKBS MS new MS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK SGKEK (4)
In order to update the group keys as well as to provide the backward secrecy, the BS needs to
send two broadcasts i.e. messages (5) and (6) below, to all MSs excluding subgroup2.
3 4 1234 34, : { , }Þ SG SG SGKEKBS MS MS GTEK SGKEK (5)
1 1234 12 1: { , , }Þ SG SGKEKBS MS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK (6)
Upon member leave event, i.e. when a MS leaves the BS coverage area, the process of the group
key updating is similar to member join event. For instance, when one MS of subgroup2 leaves
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the BS, then the BS should unicast message (7) to all remaining MSs in subgroup2. It also needs
to broadcast two messages, i.e. messages (8) and (9), to all MSs except subgroup2.
2 1234 12 2: { , , , }® SG KEKBS MS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK SGKEK (7)
3 4 1234 34, : { , }Þ SG SG SGKEKBS MS MS GTEK SGKEK (8)
1 1234 12 1
: { , , }Þ SGBS MS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK KEKSG (9)
Authors in [22] suggested an improved version of ELASPE called ELAPSE+ using cross
layering concept. They assigned fast moving MSs such as cars to specific subgroups, and made
the size of those specific subgroups to be smaller than the other subgroups. This is because,
the fast moving MSs pass through the BS’s cell length faster, and therefore they would
experience high number join or leave events, which gives rise to the need to update more group
keys. Although ELAPSE+ improves the performance of ELAPSE by reducing the amount of
rekeying messages needed to send unicast and broadcast messages, it still inherits the
drawback of handling static numbers of subgroups, subsequently resulting in weak efficiency
and scalability.
The authors in [23] proposed a hybrid key management scheme to improve the performance
of ELAPSE and ELASPE+ upon rekeying by reducing message passing. This scheme uses the
architecture of LORE [23] within a subgroup of ELAPSE. In this way, when a MS enters a BS
coverage area, the BS assigns it to a subgroup and also provides a Subgroup Forward Key Set
(SGFSet) and Subgroup Backward Key Set (SGBSet). These key sets are created by simple
Pseudo-Random Generator (PRNG) and keep the ordering of nodes inside a subgroup similar
to LORE. Hence, if there are k MSs in a subgroup, then there are k numbers of Subgroup
Forward Key (SGFK) and k numbers of Subgroup Backward Key (SGBK). In this way, for each
MS i there are two sets of keys as follows:
{ | 1 }= £ £mSGFSet SGFK m i (10)
{ | }= £ £mSGBSet SGBK i m k (11)
Figure 7 shows the revised version of ELAPSE. Here, a node i in subgroup2 has three keys
SGKEK1234, SGKEK12 and SGKEK2 as well as a two-key set SGFSeti 2 and SGBSeti 2. Upon
member join or leave event, the rekeying algorithm updates SGKEKs and GTEK, but there is
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no change in SGFSet and SGBSet sets. After a predefined time T, both SGFSet and SGBSet will
be renewed.
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Figure 7. A revised version of ELAPSE [23]
It should be noted here that this improvement in communication costs over ELAPSE, comes
at high computational and storage costs in the revised version of ELAPSE. Moreover, this
scheme gives rise to security issues such as collusion resistance [23] which means two or more
MSs must not get secret keys that they are not allowed to know, and this could be done by
exchanging their respective secret keys.
The authors in [24] improved ELAPSE by using a n-ary tree (where n>2) to improve the
efficiency of key management. Even though the proposed method shows some improvements
on the efficiency of ELAPSE, the method still suffers from the limitations associated with fixed
number of subgroups. In this method, the tree depth becomes large when the number of MS
increases, and this is the main issue with a binary tree. Therefore, they suggested that by using
n-ary, the efficiency of group key updating algorithm will improve. Figure 8 shows a 3-ary
tree with 9 subgroups.
 
SGKEK123456789 
SGKEK789 
SGKEK7 SGKEK8 
subgroup7 subgroup8 
SGKEK9 
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SGKEK6 
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subgroup2 
SGKEK3 
subgroup3 
Figure 8. A 3-ary tree [24]
The number of group keys in n-ary tree and the tree depth are given by equation (12) and (13)
respectively.
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By using n-ary tree, the BS needs to keep more group keys compared with ELAPSE method.
So, in terms of storage costs n-ary tree does not perform very well, even though the commu‐
nication costs is considerably decreased due to the reduction in communication overheads
upon group keys updating. The authors made detailed analysis to find the optimal value of n
in order to minimize the total energy consumption of the rekeying algorithm. They assumed
that transmission and reception energy are equal to total energy consumption of the networks,
whereby the energy consumption refers to the length of broadcast or unicast messages. Finally,
they came out with an optimal value of n=4, meaning that 4-ary tree would give the best
performance in terms of energy consumption.
It should be highlighted here that basically the methods in [20, 21, 23, 24] are based on ELAPSE
in that they all use tree structures, and therefore the problem associated with ELAPSE as
highlighted before still remains.
The authors in [19] proposed a new method of improving MBRA using asymmetric algorithms.
The idea of this method is to establish a common encryption key which is shared among all
MSs, but every MS has a different decryption key. This means that the BS can encrypt the
messages including the group keys, and only the valid MS can decrypt the messages. In this
way, the proposed method provides backward and forward secrecy. In terms of operational
efficiency, this method needs to perform more computations because of the use of asymmetric
cryptography, and hence this makes the MSs to expense more energy which is not good for
mobile devices. Nevertheless, one advantage of the proposed method is that it sends less
unicast/broadcast messages, and hence the overall communication cost is low. In this way,
upon member changing, the BS sends one broadcast message, but on normal key refresh, it
needs to send n unicast messages, where n is the number of MS and also the BS should send
two broadcast messages. The proposed method managed to address the backward and
forward secrecy issue of the MBRA algorithm. However, it has poor response to scalability,
since upon group key updating after the expiration time, it has to send n unicast messages.
Moreover, the method needs to make numerous modifications to the standard, which it is not
practical for implementation in real environment.
In [25] the Scalable Rekeying Algorithm (SRA) is proposed, which is based on complete binary
tree [26], and is implemented by linear linked list data structure. The SRA method improves
the scalability for ELAPSE and it can also improve the other methods [20, 21, 23, 24] which
have similar setups. As mentioned earlier, ELAPSE divides the MSs into N subgroups. In this
way, each subgroup keeps a set of group keys. In fact, ELAPSE employs a fixed number of
subgroups, consequently upon group key updating, the ELAPSE shows poor scalability. In
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addition, the method consumes more bandwidth because of the sending of high number of
unicast messages.
The SRA method establishes the number of subgroups according to the number of current MS
in the cell. Figure 9 shows a sample of node within linear linked list, where “#MS” field
indicates all MSs in a certain subgroup. The group key for that subgroup is “Group-key”. L1
and L2 are two pointer fields in the node, where L1 points to the MSs of that subgroup and L2
points to the next node (subgroup).
 #MS     Group-key     L1     L2
K
Figure 9. A node of linear linked list
The SRA method uses log (n,2) in order to subgroup the MSs, and whereby according to the
current number of MS, it increases or decreases the number of subgroups.
As highlighted before, in Mobile WiMAX, group key updating happens on three events:
1. Upon the expiry lifetime of GTEK/GKEK,
2. Upon member join event,
3. Upon member leave event.
For the first event (i.e. upon the lifetime of GTEK or GKEK expiry), the SRA and ELAPSE
methods apply similar functions. However, in SRA method, on member join/ leave, it is
necessary to add/delete a subgroup at a certain time to increase or decrease the number of
subgroups based on log(n,2).
Assuming that in the first step there is one subgroup as shown in Figure 10, it means that there
is a node in the linear linked list. Figure 10 shows a linear linked list structure corresponding
to complete binary tree. For the rest of the chapter, the tree is not drawn for the sake of
simplicity.
 
 
 
 SG
-
GTEK 
 SG
   -       SGKEK 
(a) Linear linked 
list structure 
(b) Complete binary 
tree structure
Figure 10. The creation of one subgroup
As the number of MS reaches three, a new subgroup should be added, based on log(3,2)=2.
Thus, subgroup SG breaks into 2 subgroups, SG1 and SG2. Subsequently, the MSs of SG
partition into two different sets, and afterward they are inserted separately into 2 subgroups,
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SG1 and SG2. In the properties of complete binary tree, if a node is at an index i, the left child
is at index 2*i, and the right child is at index 2*i+1. We use these properties of the tree to manage
the subgroups. In this way, SG1 is at index 2 and SG2 is at index 3. In Figure 11, two subgroups
are shown with 1 and 2 MSs in ‘#MS’ field respectively.
GTEK 
SG1  SG2
  2    SGKEK2  1    SGKEK1   -      SGKEK 
Figure 11. The creation of two subgroups
The BS unicasts two messages i.e. messages (14) and (15) to all MSs with the purpose of
updating the group keys. In this way, the BS unicasts SGKEK1 and SGKEK2 to SG1 and SG2
respectively.
1 1: { , }® SG KEKBS MS GTEK SGKEK (14)
2 2: { , }® SG KEKBS MS GTEK SGKEK (15)
As the number of MS increases beyond 5,  a new subgroup is  added, based on log(n,2).
In this case, the new node is added to the left side of the tree; the left hand side’s chil‐
dren of  the tree are regarded as 2 new subgroups.  Next,  the MSs of  SG1  divides into 2
parts and then they are associated to 2 new subgroups,  viz,  SG11  and SG12  as shown in
Figure 12.
 SG2
  3     SGKEK2  0     SGKEK1   -      SGKEK 
SG11 SG12 
 2   SGKEK12  1    SGKEK11
GTEK 
Figure 12. The creation of three subgroups
To update the group keys after inserting one new subgroup, the BS should unicast two
messages i.e. messages (16) and (17) to SG11 and SG12 respectively. Assuming that the BS
adds  the  new  MS  to  SG11,  then  the  new  group  keys  should  be  unicast  to  the  MS  by
means of message (16).
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11 1 11& : { , , , }® SG KEKBS MS newMS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK SGKEK (16)
12 1 12: { , , , }® SG KEKBS MS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK SGKEK (17)
If the number of MS is 11 or less, they join three subgroups (Figure 12), but if they exceed 11,
one new subgroup must be added. The procedure to add a new subgroup is similar to our
explanation for Figure 12. Here, SG2 divides into two subgroups i.e. SG21 and SG22. The entire
number of MSs in each subgroup is labeled in ‘#MS’ field of Figure 13, when the 12th MS enters
into the BS coverage area.
 0     SGKEK2  0     SGKEK1    -     SGKEK 
SG22
 2    SGKEK22  2    SGKEK21 
SG11
  4    SGKEK12  4    SGKEK11 
SG12 
SG21
GTEK 
Figure 13. Linear linked list showing the creation of four subgroups
Suppose a few MSs leave a cell, the total number of MS will decrease. As a result, the number
of subgroups based on log(n,2) should decrease as well. When the number of MS drops to less
than 12, SG21 and SG22 combine together into one subgroup, i.e. SG2b. Next, the whole MSs in
SG21 and SG22 add into SG2b. When the number of MS stands at 11 the subgroups that exist
becomes as shown in Figure 14. The BS unicasts message (18) including 3 new group keys to
every MS in SG2b to update the group keys.
2 2: { , , }® SG b b KEKBS MS GTEK SGKEK SGKEK (18)
 
 
 
 
 
SG2b
  5    SGKEK2b   0     SGKEK1    -     SGKEK 
SG11 SG12 
  3    SGKEK12 3     SGKEK11 
GTEK 
Figure 14. Linear linked list showing the creation of three subgroups
In the forthcoming, the SRA method is compared and analyzed against MBRA [3] and ELAPSE
[21]. The MBRA unicasts n messages to all current MSs as well as new MS upon member
joining, and upon member leaving, it unicasts n-1 messages (since 1 MS leaves the cell). As
mentioned earlier, ELAPSE creates a permanent number of subgroups, therefore when the
number of MS in a cell grows, the number of transmitted unicast messages increases likewise.
The entire number of transmitted unicast messages in ELAPSE is (n/N); in fact, it is (n/N)+1
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for member joining and (n/N)-1 for member leaving. In SRA, the number of MS in each
subgroup is n/log(n,2), and therefore the number of unicast messages is likewise n/(log(n,2))
on member joining/leaving. The comparison among the MBRA, ELAPSE and SAR is shown
in Table 2, where ELAPSE4 means four subgroups, and ELAPSE8 means 8 subgroups.
Methods
Unicast Messages
Join Leave
MBRA O(n) + 1 O(n)−1
ELAPSE4 O(n 4) + 1 O(n 4)−1
ELAPSE8 O(n 8) + 1 O(n 8)−1
SAR  O( nlog2n ) + 1  O( nlog2n )−1
Table 2. Comparative analysis [25]
Figure 15a & b show the comparison among the rekeying algorithms in terms of unicast
messages. Here, y-axis represents the number of unicast messages, and x-axis is the number
of MS. As shown in Figure 15a, in the MBRA, the number of unicast messages increase with
growing number of MS, and clearly it does not address the question of scalability. Figure
15b shows the analysis among the tree-based rekeying algorithms only. This is also the case
with ELAPSE, where the number of unicast messages increases with the number of MS in each
subgroup. On the other hand, in SRA the number of unicast messages is less than in ELAPSE,
which means that it provides a good scalability even at high number of MS.
Figure 16 shows a magnified view of Figure 15, for the number of MS between 200 to 400 in
Figure 16a, and 500 to 700 in Figure 16b, respectively. It is clear from the Figure that in SRA
method, as the number of MS increases the number of transmitted unicast messages increases
with a much lesser degree than for ELAPSE. In other words, the difference between the number
of unicast messages between SRA and ELAPSE widens. For example, when there are 400 MSs
(Figure 16a), the difference between the number of transmitted unicast messages in the SRA
and ELAPSE8 is around 5, but when there are 700 MSs (Figure 16b), this difference is around
10. This shows that SRA method has a good scalability performance especially at high number
of MS in the cell.
Figure 17 depicts a summarised comparison between SRA and ELAPSE. Clearly, SRA reduces
the number of unicast messages upon implementing rekeying algorithm, and therefore it has
better scalability compared with ELAPSE. Even though ELAPSE8 shows comparable per‐
formance with SRA especially at lower number of MS, the number of MS in a subgroup has to
be defined in advance and neither it is dynamic.
Finally, Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of the rekeying algorithms which have
been highlighted in this chapter.
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Scheme Forward/BackwardSecrecy Scalability & 1-affects-n Operational efficiency
*
MBRA[3] not supported Very weak Non optimal
Xu et al.[18] Supported weak Non optimal
GKDA[20] supported good Non optimal
Chakraborty et al.[23] supported good Non optimal
Kambourakis et al.[19] supported good Non optimal
ELAPSE [21] supported good Non optimal
Brown et al.[24] supported good Non optimal
SRA[25] supported Very good Near optimal
*This shows the trade-off among communication, computational overheads.
Table 3. Summary of the main performance parameters of rekeying algorithms
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Figure 15. Unicast messages
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(b) Range 500...700 
200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
# of MSs
# 
of
 
Un
ica
st
 
M
es
sa
ge
s
 
ELAPSE4
ELAPSE8
SRA
500 520 540 560 580 600 620 640 660 680 70040
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
# of MSs
# 
of
 
Un
ica
st
 
M
es
sa
ge
s
 
ELAPSE4
ELAPSE8
SRA
Figure 16. Unicast messages in tree rekeying
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4. Conclusions
In this chapter, we reviewed the MBRA rekeying algorithm of the IEEE 802.16e and analyzed
several rekeying algorithms for Mobile WiMAX. We reviewed the rekeying algorithms with
emphasis on performance and security particularly their effects on operational efficiency,
scalability and 1-affects-n phenomenon as well as backward and forward secrecy. We showed
that SRA rekeying algorithm is a strong algorithm from the scalability aspect, because it
establishes the number of subgroups dynamically and hence strikes a good balance between
the number of MS in each subgroup and the total number of subgroups. The overall result is
a reduction in the number of unicast messages on rekeying which produce better scalability
and efficiency. The future work will focus on reducing energy consumption in the MSs upon
rekeying, by broadcasting the group keys to only the selected MSs that need them, rather than
sending to all MSs.
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